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He played all sorts of roles foolish and indecent, but language is not sufficient to paint 
a portrait of his doings. For sometimes he pretended to have a limp, sometimes he 
jumped around, sometimes he dragged himself along on his buttocks, sometimes he 
stuck out his foot for someone running and tripped him. Other times when there was a 
new moon, he looked at the sky and fell down and thrashed about. Sometimes also he 
pretended to babble, for he said that of all semblances, this one is most fitting and most 
useful to those who simulate folly for the sake of Christ. For this reason, often he 
reproved and restrained sins, and he sent divine wrath to someone to correct him, and 
he made predictions and did everything he wanted, only he changed his voice and (the 
position of) his limbs completely. And in all that he did, they believed that he was just 
like the many who babbled and prophesied because of demons.2  
 
A hagiographer can be described in the most basic terms as a person who writes hagiography, 
as the author of a hagiographical work.3 Even if we cannot establish his (or her)4 historical 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank the organisers and participants of the 2015 colloquium on Hagiography as Literature held 
at the University of Edinburgh and the editors of this volume for their enthusiasm and inspiring feedback on 
early versions of this article. I am also grateful to Koen De Temmerman and Kristoffel Demoen for providing me 
with useful remarks and feedback. This article was made possible by the support of both the ERC Starting Grant 
“Novel Saints” at Ghent University (Grant Agreement 337344) and the FWO Flanders. 
2 Πάντα δὲ διὰ σχημάτων σαλῶν καὶ ἀσχήμων ἐποίει, ἀλλ’ οὐ δύναται ὁ λόγος τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰκόνα 
ὑποδεῖξαι. ἦν γὰρ ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν ποτὲ μὲν κοξαρίζοντα, ποτὲ δὲ πηδῶντα, ποτὲ δὲ συρόμενον εἰς τὰ καθίσματα, 
ποτὲ δὲ βάλλοντα πόδα τινὶ τρέχοντι καὶ ῥίπτονα αὐτόν. πάλιν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῆς σελήνης γένναν ἐποίει ἑαυτὸν εἰς 
τὸν οὐρανὸν θεωροῦντα καὶ πίπτοντα καὶ λακταρίζοντα. ἔστιν δὲ ὅτε καὶ τὸν διαλαλοῦντα προσεποιεῖτο. ἔλεγεν 
γὰρ πλεῖον ὅλων τῶν σχημάτων ἁρμόζειν καὶ συμβάλλεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα τοῖς προσποιουμένοις μωρίαν 
διὰ Χριστόν. διὰ τούτου γὰρ πολλάκις καὶ ἤλεγχεν καὶ ἀνέκοπτεν ἁμαρτίας καὶ ὀργήν τινι πρὸς διόρθωσιν 
ἔπεμπεν καὶ προέλεγέν τινα καὶ ὅσα ἤθελεν ἐποίει, μόνον δὲ ὅτι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φωνὴν καὶ τὰ μέλη ἐξήλλασσεν. Καὶ 
ὅσαπερ ἂν ἐποίει, εἶχον αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς τοὺς ἐκ δαιμόνων διαλαλοῦντας καὶ προφητεύοντας. (The 
Life of Symeon 89.19–90.4, trans. Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool, 159) For the Life of Symeon, I cite the edition 
by André Jean Festugière, Léontios de Neapolis. Vie de Syméon le Fou et Vie de Jean de Chypre (Paris: Librairie 
orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1974). References to this edition will consist of the page in Festugière’s volume 
followed by the number(s) of the line(s). All translations from the Life of Symeon are taken from Derek Krueger, 
Symeon the Holy Fool: Leontius’ Life and the Late Antique City (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1996). For 
the Life of Andrew, I cite the edition and translation by Lennart Rydén, The Life of St Andrew the Fool Vol. II, 
Text Translation and Notes, Acta Universatis Upsaliensis, Studia Byzantina Upsaliensa 4 (Uppsala: Textgruppen 
i Uppsala AB, 1995). References to the text or the translation will consist of the number(s) of the line(s) in 
Rydén’s volume. 
3 Among the many various subgenres that hagiography comprises, this chapter, when speaking about ‘the 
hagiographer’, refers primarily to authors of saints’ Lives. 
4 Although often the subject of hagiographical accounts themselves, women seldom appear to have been writers 
of hagiography; see Martin Hinterberg, “The Byzantine Hagiographer and his Text”, in Stephanos Efthymiadis 
(ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Byzantine Hagiography, vol. 1: Genres and Contexts (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2014), 211–46 at 215. For reasons of convenience, I will refer to the hagiographer as masculine in the 
rest of this chapter.  
identity, every hagiographical document implies through its mere existence a hagiographer-
figure who composed the text. If the composition of a hagiographical text is the task that defines 
the hagiographer, then it is our goal to understand this task, in all its complexities.  
Scholars have shed light on different aspects of the hagiographer’s task, although in 
general, the focus has been on the saints themselves more than on their hagiographers.5 An 
important aspect that has been highlighted by Derek Krueger is the ascetic dimension of writing 
hagiography.6 His study shows that late antique and early Byzantine models of authorship 
conceive of literary composition as a religious activity which involves the practice of humility 
and religious self-fashioning. Consequently, the hagiographer aligns himself with his literary 
subject, the saint.  
In addition, Martin Hinterberg has shed further light on the literary dimension of the 
hagiographer and his task by pointing out that hagiographers tend to present themselves in close 
connection to the saint, even if this requires a serious distortion of the historical framework of 
the story.7 His observations point towards a related aspect of the hagiographer’s literary task 
that has not yet reached its full potential as an object of modern study, namely the fact that the 
hagiographer often writes a fictionalised account.8 Indeed, it is well known that Lives of Saints 
can hardly be seen as reliable, historically accurate accounts of the conducts of a holy man.9 
Nevertheless, even if these biographies of presumed historical figures are full of invented 
elements,10 their narrators generally claim to tell the truth and, as Peter Turner shows, go to 
great lengths to convince their audiences of the truthfulness of their writings.11 As a result of 
this apparent contradiction, hagiography cannot easily be categorized according to the labels of 
fiction and nonfiction, inherent to a modern understanding of literature.12 This difficulty has led 
                                                 
5 This is also noted by Hinterberg, “The Byzantine Hagiographer and his Text”, 211. This chapter is useful 
starting point for any study on the figure of the hagiographer. 
6 Derek Krueger, Writing and Holiness: The Practice of Authorship in the Early Christian East (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). See also the chapter by Yuzwa in the present volume where it is 
suggested that the practice of rewriting and rereading of hagiography is itself salvific. 
7 Hinterberg, “The Byzantine Hagiographer and his Text”, 213–14. 
8 ‘Fictionalised’ is used in this chapter with the meaning of ‘containing fictive elements’. See below, pp. 000, for 
a theoretical discussion on the use of the terms fiction and fictionality.  
9 See for example Hippolyte Delehaye, Les légendes hagiographiques (Bruxelles: Société des Bollandistes 
,19554), and Timothy D. Barnes, Early Christian Hagiography and Roman History (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2010).  
10 Sometimes even the saint him-/herself is an invented character. This is the case for the Life of Andrew, as we 
will see later in this chapter. For a discussion on Leontius of Neapolis’ literary creativity in writing the Life of 
Symeon, see Paul Magdalino (“What we heard in the Lives of saints we have seen with our own eyes: the holy 
man as literary text in tenth-century Constantinople”, in James Howard-Johnston and Paul A. Hayward (eds.), 
The Cult of Saints in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Essays on the Contribution of Peter Brown (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1999), 83–112 at 84–5), who looks at the impact of the acknowledgement of the 
fictionalised nature of hagiography on a study of the holy man (rather than on the hagiographer, who is the focus 
of this chapter). 
11 Peter Turner, Truthfulness, Realism, Historicity: A Study of Late Antique Spiritual Literature (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2012) discusses different literary techniques hagiographers employ to convince their readers of the 
truthfulness of their accounts. As such, he emphasizes the realistic stance of hagiography and discloses what he 
calls ‘hagiographical realism’.  
12 In this respect, the recent chapter by Koen De Temmerman on fictionality in ancient biography is useful, since 
it deals with similar questions (“Ancient biography and formalities of fiction”, in Koen De Temmerman and 
Kristoffel Demoen (eds.), Writing Biography in Greece and Rome: Narrative Technique and Fictionalization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 3–25). 
scholars who focus on the question of historical accuracy and treat the Acts of Martyrs and the 
Lives of Saints as historical sources to discard many hagiographical texts due to their 
‘legendary’ character.13 And even if hagiography has now become the object of literary 
investigation,14 which embraces rather than dismisses its fictionalised character, only very 
recently have scholars started to pay particular attention to the fictionality of hagiography as an 
object of investigation in itself, trying to voice and resolve the theoretical difficulties that are 
tied up with it.15  
How can we, as a modern audience, understand the hagiographer and his puzzling task 
of writing hagiography, which involves practising at once holiness and fictionalisation? As its 
title suggests, in this chapter I would like to make a comparison between the hagiographer 
(meant as a generic concept rather than a concrete individual)16 and a particular type of saint, 
the holy fool. This comparison is inspired by Stavroula Constantinou’s reference to ‘masked 
authors’ in her chapter on the holy fool and the cross-dresser as ‘actors’ and ‘actresses’.17 I 
believe there is some mileage in pursuing the analogy between the masked fool and the author 
of hagiography further, since, perhaps not by their concrete actions, but rather by the intended 
results of those actions, the hagiographer and the fool are not entirely dissimilar to one another. 
In other words, an understanding of the character of the holy fool can help a modern audience 
to acquire a better understanding of the hagiographer’s task and his relation with his readership, 
                                                 
13 Exemplary are the studies by René Aigrain, L’hagiographie: ses sources, ses méthodes, son histoire 
(Bruxelles: Société des Bollandistes, 1953), and Hippolyte Delehaye, Les passions des martyrs et les genres 
littéraires (Bruxelles: Société des Bollandistes, 1966), as well as Herbert Musurillo, The Acts of the Christian 
Martyrs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), which contains editions of only 28 texts out of hundreds of possible 
candidates, based on criteria of historicity. 
14 Already in the 1980s, Alison G. Elliott devoted careful attention to the narrative construction of late antique 
saints’ Lives in her Roads to Paradise, Reading the Lives of the Early Saints (London: University Press of New 
England 1987). More and more scholars have picked up a literary approach to hagiography ever since, studying 
these texts as creative pieces of literature, the need for which has been voiced eloquently by Lennart Rydén in 
his chapter on “Literariness in Byzantine Saints’ Lives”, in Paolo Odorico and Panagiotis A. Agapitos (eds.), Les 
Vies des saints à Byzance. Genre littéraire ou biographie historique? Actes du IIe colloque international 
philologique ‘EPMHNEIA’ (Paris: Centre d’études byzantines, néo-helléniques et sud-est européennes, EHESS, 
2004), 49–58.  
15 Turner, Truthfulness, Realism, Historicity made an important contribution in this respect: even though his 
study approaches the problem of fictionality from the opposite direction, namely as a problem of historicity, his 
examination of what truthfulness and realism actually meant in a late antique Christian context is revealing for 
the dynamics on a literary level. A recent chapter by Charis Messis on the phenomenon of ‘novelisation’ in 
hagiography also constitutes a step towards a better understanding of the problem of its fictionality: “Fiction 
and/or Novelisation in Byzantine Hagiography”, in Efthymiadis (ed.), Ashgate Research Companion, vol. 2, 
313–42. Finally, it is worth mentioning the volume edited by Panagiotis Roilos, Medieval Greek Storytelling: 
Fictionality and Narrative in Byzantium (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2014), which also includes discussions of 
late antique hagiographical material.  
16 It should be clear by now that the ‘hagiographer’ with which this chapter is concerned, does not coincide with 
the extra-textual, historical author. Nor does he fully coincide with the primary narrator, as this depends on the 
particular narrative situation which differs from text to text. Rather, I use ‘hagiographer’ as an overarching term 
to refer to what can be called the ‘implied author’ (Wolf Schmid, “Implied Author”, in Jan C. Meister (ed.), The 
Living Handbook of Narratology (Hamburg: Hamburg University 2013), Website http://wikis.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/lhn/index.php/Implied_Author, last accessed 07/05/2018). On the complex constellation of the 
historical author, implied author and primary narrator in Byzantine hagiography, see Lennart Rydén, “Fiction 
and Reality in the Hagiographer’s Self-presentation”, TM 14 (2002), 547–52, and Martin Hinterberg, “The 
Byzantine Hagiographer and his Text”, 212–15 (and esp. note 5). 
17 Stavroula Constantinou, “Holy Actors and Actresses: Fools and Cross-Dressers as the Protagonists of Saints’ 
Lives”, in Efthymiadis, Ashgate Research Companion, vol. 2, 343–62 at 356–57. 
at least with regard to one particular dimension, namely the paradoxical meeting point of 
fictionality and truth.  
  
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
The term ‘holy fool’ or ‘σαλὸς διὰ Χριστόν’ (‘fool for Christ’s sake’) refers to a particular type 
of saint and a specific literary character type in Byzantine hagiography that remained popular 
from its early stages until the current day.18 The most famous ones are probably Symeon Salos 
and Andrew Salos, but their stories are part of a broad religious and literary tradition of holy 
folly in late antiquity and beyond.19 Vincent Déroche disentangled the history of the figure of 
the salos as the simultaneous development of two types: the active and the passive salos.20 
While the passive salos lives quietly in a monastic community and pretends to be mad as a 
means of reaching the virtuous state of apatheia (‘insensibility’) while avoiding worldly praise 
of his/her fellow monks,21 the active salos usually obtains apatheia while living a solitary life 
in the desert, and then returns to the world to mock it. The goal of his feigned madness is not 
just to mask his own virtue, but to act on his urban environment and to save souls.22  
My comparison between the hagiographer and the holy fool is concerned with the 
second type, the active salos. Symeon of Emesa is the prime example of this type of holy folly, 
but apart from his Life, written by Leontius of Neapolis in the seventh century (BHG 1677), 
two other texts deal with a holy fool of his kind: the Life of Paul the Corinthian (BHG 2362) 
and the Life of Andrew Salos (BHG 115z), written by a certain Nikephoros, most likely in the 
tenth century.23 Since the Life of Paul has not been transmitted in full,24 this chapter will focus 
on the Lives of Symeon and Andrew.  
Both Symeon and Andrew spend a lifetime pretending to be mad; while hiding their true 
identities as holy men and displaying subversive behaviour, they edify the people of the city. 
They eat insatiably, deal with base women, pretend to be drunk, walk around naked and relieve 
                                                 
18 Constantinou, “Holy Actors”, 343–45. 
19 Lennart Rydén provides a nice overview of the type of the holy fool in Greek hagiography: “The Holy Fool”, 
in S. Hackel (ed.), The Byzantine Saint (London: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1981), 106–13. Krueger traces 
the shared context of stories of holy folly and concealed sanctity in Late Antique and Early Byzantine culture 
(Symeon the Holy Fool, ch. 4). 
20 This distinction corresponds to the geographical opposition between Syria and Egypt and the religious 
opposition between eremitism and coenobitism; see Vincent Déroche, Études sur Léontios de Néapolis, Acta 
Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Byzantina Upsaliensa 3 (Uppsala: Textgruppen i Uppsala AB, 1995), 177. On 
this distinction, see also José Grosdidier de Matons, “Les thèmes d’édification dans la vie d’André Salos”, TM 4 
(1970), 277–328. 
21 A famous example is the anonymous nun in Palladius’ Lausiac History (34, 1). 
22 Déroche, Études sur Léontios de Néapolis, 176: ‘La différence avec le type précédent tient à l’utilisation de la 
folie feinte : au lieu d’être un simple moyen de masquer sa vertu et de progresser dans l’humiliation, la folie 
provocante peut aussi être un moyen d’agir sur le monde et de sauver des âmes.’ 
23 The author presents himself as Nikephoros in the epilogue of his text. However, the historical identity of the 
author is not certain. On the author of the Life of Andrew, see Lennart Rydén, The Life of St Andrew the Fool 
Vol. I, Introduction, Testimonies and Nachleben, Acta Universatis Upsaliensis, Studia Byzantina Upsaliensa 4 
(Uppsala: Textgruppen i Uppsala AB, 1995), 57. On the date of the Life, see Lennart Rydén, “Date of the ‘Life 
of Andreas Salos’”, DOP 32 (1978), 127–55. 
24 On the Life of Paul and its textual tradition, see Sergei Ivanov, “St Paul the Corinthian, Holy Fool”, in E. 
Kountoura-Galake (ed.), The Heroes of the Orthodox Church. The New Saints, 8th–16th C. (Athens: Institute for 
Byzantine Research, 2004), 39–46.  
themselves publicly, but they also perform miracles. More importantly, their narratives address 
questions concerning truth, falsehood, belief and deception. On the one hand, the image of holy 
folly can serve as a metaphor for the task of the hagiographer in general: just like the holy fool 
edifies the people in the city by putting on a theatrical show, the hagiographer conveys a 
religious truth by writing a fictionalised narrative. On the other hand, the Lives of Symeon and 
Andrew may serve as concrete case studies for exploring this particular metaphorical 
connection. As we will see, the paradox that is involved in writing the story of a holy fool (how 
was the hagiographer able to write the story of a secret saint?), forces the hagiographer into 
employing all kinds of strategies to ensure his authority, aligning him with his saintly subject 
in unexpected ways.25  
I would like to emphasize that holy folly as a metaphor for the hagiographer’s task does 
not derive from contemporary evidence: in other words, I do not claim that Byzantines saw 
hagiographers as holy fools. The value of comparing the two lies in the fact that it allows to 
circumvent the modern bias of a rigid distinction between fiction and nonfiction when thinking 
about the problem of fictionality in saints’ Lives; it allows us to imagine it in a narrative 
language belonging to the hagiographical realm itself. At the same time, as modern readers, we 
can never entirely shake off these categories and the mental concepts they are tied up with. In 
fact, it will be helpful to attempt to define what scholars understand nowadays by ‘fiction’ and 
‘nonfiction’, before venturing into the world of hagiography.  
The past decades have produced an abundance of literature on theory of fiction, in which 
different approaches have generated different definitions of the notions of fiction, nonfiction, 
and their relation to other theoretical concepts such as fictionality, fictiveness and 
fictionalisation.26 However, bearing in mind the difficulties of applying the modern framework 
of fiction and nonfiction to hagiography, I would like to focus on those ideas that are best suited 
to be transferred to the world of ancient, late-antique and early medieval literature because they 
allow a broad understanding of these concepts. In this respect, Marie-Laure Ryan’s 1997 article 
‘Postmodernism and the Doctrine of Panfictionality’ is extremely useful, where she defines 
fiction and nonfiction in terms of a specific set of game rules.27  
                                                 
25 I cautiously hypothesise that what will be argued for the Lives of Symeon and Andrew and their hagiographers 
holds general significance for the writing of saints’ Lives and applies to ‘the hagiographer’ in the broader sense. 
To fully support this claim, I would like to extend this study by testing the validity of the analogy on a larger 
corpus of Lives in a later stage of research. 
26 Most influential are speech act theory (John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975²), and John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)), fictional worlds theory (Thomas Pavel, Fictional Worlds 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), and Marie-Laure Ryan, “Possible Worlds in Recent 
Literary Theory”, Style 26.4 (1992), 528–54), fiction as make-believe (Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-
believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990²)) 
and fiction(ality) as rhetoric (Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983²), and Richard Walsh, The Rhetoric of Fictionality. Narrative Theory and the Idea of 
Fiction (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2007)).  
27 Four years earlier, John Morgan already talked about fiction in terms of game rules in his contribution on the 
fictionality of the ancient Greek novel: “Make-Believe and Make Believe: The Fictionality of the Greek 
Novels”, in Christopher Gill and Timothy P. Wiseman (eds.), Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World (Exeter: 
University of Exeter Press, 1993), 175–229 at 186, 194 and 210. Although he does not pursue an actual theory of 
fiction based on the notion of game rules, he shows that the idea is suitable to be applied to pre-modern 
literature. The idea of fiction as a game goes back to Walton’s famous study, Mimesis as Make-believe.  
According to Ryan, the rules of nonfiction ‘specify that the text is to be evaluated in 
terms of truth’.28 As a result, the text enters into a polemical relation with other representations 
that share the same frame of reference, which is the real world in which we live.29 By contrast, 
the rules of fiction specify that the text ‘makes no claim to external truth but rather guarantees 
its own truth’.30 This truth is called the ‘fictional truth’; it is only truth within the unique 
fictional world generated by the text, that functions as its frame of reference.31 This unique 
fictional world of reference can, to a certain degree, present overlap with the real world in which 
we live. Thus, reading fiction is ‘a form of double-think, a game of truth … in which the 
ordinary rules of truth and falsehood are both simulated and suspended’.32  
Defining fiction and nonfiction as a set of game rules has advantages. For instance, it 
acknowledges that fiction and nonfiction are not ontological categories; that a novel, for 
example, is not inherently fictional, but is regarded as such and read as such, because both 
author and reader approach it according to the same game rules (i.e. those of fiction, described 
above).33 However, this means also that it is perfectly possible that one person would place a 
certain book in the nonfiction-section of a library, while another person would place the same 
book in the fiction-section. The problem with hagiography is precisely that we do not know on 
what shelf the Life of Symeon, for instance, belonged.  
Finally, an important distinction, one that I would like to adopt, has been made by 
scholars who have pointed out that the term ‘fiction’ can in fact be employed to refer to two 
different things: that which is ‘fictitious’ or ‘fictive’ (i.e. which is not true, a lie), and that which 
is ‘fictional’ (i.e. which, in line with Ryan’s definition of fiction, is not susceptible to truth-
judgment, such as a modern novel).34 The former use of ‘fiction’ is the one at work in studies 
like those by Hippolyte Delehaye and Timothy Barnes,35 who are concerned with finding out 
to what extent a hagiography is historically reliable. However, if hagiographies are to a certain 
extent ‘fictions’ in the sense of ‘not historically accurate’ (i.e. the first meaning of fiction 
described above), but at the same time engage in claims of truthfulness, and if we take these 
claims seriously (as Turner suggests we should),36 then they are not to be straightforwardly 
                                                 
28 Marie-Laure Ryan, “Postmodernism and the Doctrine of Panfictionality”, Narrative 5.2 (1997), 165–87 at 166. 
29 On theory of frames of reference, see also Benjamin Harshaw, “Fictionality and Fields of Reference. Remarks 
on a Theoretical Framework”, Poetics Today 5.2 (1984), 227–51. 
30 Ryan, “Postmodernism and the Doctrine of Panfictionality”, 167. 
31 Cf. Dorrit Cohn, The Distinction of Fiction (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 13: 
‘A work of fiction itself creates the world to which it refers by referring to it.’ 
32 Michael Wood, “Prologue”, in Gill and Wiseman, Lies and Fiction, xiii–xviii at xvi. 
33 The idea that the fictional status of a text relies on a mutual awareness of both author and reader that what is 
written is outside of truth-judgment is expressed by many critics. Examples are Walsh, The Rhetoric of 
Fictionality, 36; Morgan, “Make-Believe”, 180; and Northrop Frye, The Secular Scripture. A Study of the 
Structure of Romance (Cambridge Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 17. The same idea is 
evoked by the concept of fiction as a communicative contract between author and (implied) reader, put forward, 
among others, by Stein Haugom Olsen and Peter Lamarque, Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical 
Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996²).  
34 On this distinction see Calin Andrei Mihailescu and Walid Hamarneh, “Introduction: Under the Jealous Gaze 
of Truth”, in iid. (eds.), Fiction Updated. Theories of Fictionality, Narratology and Poetics (Toronto and 
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 3–18 at 8; Cohn, The Distinction of Fiction, 3; Jean-Marie 
Schaeffer, Pourquoi la fiction ? (Paris: Seuil, 1999); and De Temmerman, “Ancient biography and formalities of 
fiction”, 5. 
35 Cf. note 9. 
36 Turner, Truthfulness, 43. 
identified with ‘fiction’ in the second sense of the term. As a result, we must distinguish ‘fiction’ 
from ‘fictionality’.37 Fictionality refers to the result of the hagiographer’s deliberate shaping of 
the narrative according to criteria other than historicity, his literary fashioning. The point is that 
this does not automatically turn the narrative into literary ‘fiction’ as defined by Ryan; it does 
not necessarily place it outside of truth-judgment.  
The rest of this chapter will further tease out the analogy between the holy fool and the 
hagiographer. First, using the metaphor of the fool’s mask, I look at the way the hagiographer 
presents himself (with a particular focus on the more covert strategies of authorisation which 
hagiographers could employ in addition to explicit truth claims). Second, I examine how the 
fool’s/hagiographer’s self-presentation reflects upon the expected relation with his audience. 
Comparing the performance of the fool in the city with the literary performance of the 
hagiographer will hopefully help to make sense of the ‘contract’ between the hagiographer and 
his readership that is promoted by his text, of the rules that are governed by its game. 
 
THE MASK OF THE HOLY FOOL/HAGIOGRAPHER 
And wanting him to refresh his body, John said to him playfully, “Come 
take a bath, Fool!” And Symeon said to him, laughing, “Yes, let’s go, let’s 
go!” And with these words, he stripped off his garment and placed it on 
his head, wrapping it around like a turban. And Deacon John said to him, 
“Put it back on, brother, for truly if you are going to walk around naked, I 
won’t go with you.” Abba Symeon said to him, “Go away, idiot, I’m all 
ready. If you won’t come, see, I’ll go a little ahead of you.” And leaving 
him, he kept a little ahead.38  
As is illustrated in this passage, during his act of pretended folly Symeon makes sure to dress 
in the appropriate costume (or should we say ‘undress’?). Stavroula Constantinou discusses ‘the 
mask of the holy fool’, behind which he hides his true identity.39 The mask or the disguise of 
the holy man consists of few clothes: it is his nakedness in particular which marks his position 
of fool.40 Constantinou points out that the mask of the saint is more than just a means to hide 
his identity: ‘costume serves a twofold function: it directs the wearer’s actions, and it generates 
a specific set of expectations.’41 Thus, the nakedness of the saint is part of his public spectacle 
and contributes to the construction of his reputation as a madman. Besides the mask of nudity, 
                                                 
37 Simona Zetterberg Gjerlevsen and Henrik Skov Nielsen defend this view in a forthcoming chapter in the 
Narratologia-series entitled “Distinguishing Fictionality” (2018). 
38 ... βουληθεὶς ὡς ἐν τάξει παιγνίδιου ἀνακτήσασθαι αὐτοῦ τὸ σῶμα λέγει αὐτῷ· “ἔρχῃ λούῃ, Σαλέ;” λέγει αὐτῷ 
ἐκεῖνος γελῶν· “ναί, ἄγωμεν ἄγωμεν” καὶ σὺν τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδύεται τὸ ἱμάτιον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιτίθει αὐτὸ εἰς τὴν 
κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ δήσας αὐτὸ εἰς αὐτὴν ὡς φακιόλιν. καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ κύρις Ἰωάννης· “φόρεσον, ἀδελφέ, ἐπεὶ 
ὄντως ἐὰν γυμνὸς περιπατεῖς, ἐγὼ μετὰ σοῦ οὐκ ἔρχομαι”. λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ ἀββᾶς Συμεών· “ὕπαγε, ἔξηχε, ἐγὼ 
ἔργον πρὸ ἔργου ἐποίησα. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔρχῃ, ἴδε ἐγὼ προλαμβάνω σε μικρόν.” καὶ ἀφεὶς αὐτὸν προεποίησεν ὀλίγον. 
(Life of Symeon 82.24–83.3, trans. Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool, 153–54) 
39 Constantinou, “Holy Actors”, 348–52. 
40 Symeon appears naked in lines 82.27 (cf. the passage quoted above) and 90.18–19. Andrew appears to walk 
around nearly naked the whole time due to extreme poverty, as becomes clear from the passage about the severe 
winter storm (lines 422–42). His nakedness is explicitly mentioned in lines 86, 276, 332, 1039 and 1452.  
41 Constantinou, “Holy Actors”, 349. 
Symeon adopts other costumes as well. When entering the city of Emesa, he binds the corpse 
of a dead dog to his belt and drags it along.42 Apart from the symbolic significance of the deed,43 
this very first act of foolishness turns out to be extremely effective in portraying an image and 
creating a first impression: once the schoolchildren see him running around like this, they 
immediately start calling him a ‘crazy abba’.44 Thus, the so-called ‘mask of foolishness’45 that 
is adopted by the holy fool turns out to be a theatrical costume, crucial to the success of his 
performance in the city.  
The hagiographer, like the holy fool, also hides behind a mask in his writing in order to 
provoke a specific set of expectations in his audience. As Constantinou observes, often 
‘hagiographers hide their real identities and intentions behind their fictitious protagonists and 
their own pen names (Nikephoros, Eulogia) or anonymity’.46 However, hagiographers found 
other ways to mask themselves as well, I would add. As Lennart Rydén notes, saints’ Lives are 
generally characterized by a complex relation between the historical author, implied author, 
primary narrator and protagonist, resulting in ‘several degrees of visibility’ in which the 
hagiographer can appear.47 In the Lives of the fools, we find examples of various techniques 
employed to complicate this constellation of narrative voices, resulting either in a higher or a 
lower degree of visibility of the hagiographer. However, as we shall see, in both cases, these 
techniques aim at masking the hagiographer’s deliberate shaping of the narrative and are 
intended to authorize his narration.  
A well-established way of disguising authorship among hagiographers is to present the 
Life of a saint as an eyewitness report, a technique that has been identified by Hippolyte 
Delehaye as ‘la fiction littéraire du témoin bien informé’.48 Often, the ‘well informed witness’ 
is presented as one of the characters of the story. This happens in the Life of Symeon Salos, 
where Leontius claims to have heard the story from John the Deacon, who is presented as a 
close friend of Symeon and a reliable source. When Leontius has narrated the beginning of 
Symeon’s story, he suddenly comments:  
All this Symeon narrated in Emesa, where he pretended to be a fool, to a 
certain deacon of the holy cathedral church of the same city of Emesa, an 
excellent and virtuous man, who, by the divine grace which had come to 
him, understood the monk’s work, and it was on his behalf that this most 
blessed Symeon performed a wonderful marvel, which we shall recall in 
                                                 
42 Life of Symeon 79.19–25. 
43 The dragging of the dead dog has been interpreted as a symbolic act by Constantinou, “Holy Actors”, 351, and 
others, e.g. Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool, 90 on its link with the Cynic tradition and Vincent Déroche, Syméon 
Salos, le fou en Christ (Paris: Paris-Méditerranée, 2000), 59–60.  
44 ἀββᾶς μωρός (Life of Symeon 79.24–5). The very first act of foolishness performed by Andrew, which also has 
the desired effect of constituting his false identity of fool, consists of ripping up his clothes. Again the symbolic 
function of the act (referring to the naked state of the fool for Christ’s sake in this case) coexists with its 
immediate effectiveness.  
45 For the ‘Maske der Verrückheit’, see Ernst Benz, “Heilige Narrheit”, Kyrios 3 (1938), 1–55, Walter Nigg, Der 
christliche Narr (Stuttgart: Artemis-Verlag, 1956), and Peter Hauptmann, “Die ‘Narren um Christi Willen’ in der 
Ostkirche”, Kirche im Osten 2 (1959), 27–49. 
46 Constantinou, “Holy Actors”, 356. 
47 Rydén, “Fiction and Reality”, 547. See also my note 16. 
48 Delehaye, Les passions des martyrs et les genres littéraires, 182. 
its proper place. This aforementioned John, beloved of God, a virtuous 
deacon, narrated for us almost the entire life of that most wise one, calling 
on the Lord as witness to his story, that he had written nothing to add to 
the narrative, but rather that since that time he had forgotten most things.49 
 
From now on the story is presented to the reader through the filter of John’s trustworthy 
testimony (as indicated by φησίν (‘so he said’) appearing on the next line). Thus, while the first 
half of the Life, which takes place in the desert in the absence of John the Deacon, is accounted 
for by the assuring words that ‘all this Symeon narrated [to him] in Emesa’, the second half, set 
in Emesa, is accounted for by the fact that John was present himself to witness everything from 
close by. Moreover, since John is the only one living in the city who is aware of Symeon’s real 
identity and of his holiness from the beginning, he is the ideal source for the hagiographer’s 
information on the secret saint.50 
It has often been assumed that Leontius’ claim to John’s testimony is no more than a 
literary construction, as it would be highly unlikely that Leontius (who lived in the seventh 
century) met a contemporary of Symeon (who lived in the sixth).51 Krueger, on the other hand, 
argues that there is no reason to assume that Leontius did not intend to convey the idea that he 
used a written source by John the Deacon, rather than an oral account.52 Either way, the point 
is that Leontius skilfully validates his claims concerning the reliability of his sources through 
the way in which he works them into his narrative.53 In the passage quoted above, mentioning 
the fact that John admits to his own forgetfulness bolsters his image as a reliable source, as it 
shows him to be self-aware about his own fallibility and, consequently, that he can be trusted 
on what he transmits. A later passage confirms once again that Symeon ‘told him [John] his 
whole life’.54 The scene evokes a situation in which John can ask the saint all kinds of questions 
and thereby has access to a first-hand account of the saint’s personal experiences, once again 
representing him as a reliable source. By presenting the narrative as coming from John, who 
                                                 
49 Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐξηγήσατο ὁ ἐνάρετος Συμεών τινι ἐν Ἐμέσῃ, ἔνθα καὶ τὸν σαλὸν προσεποιήσατο, διακόνῳ 
τῆς ἁγίας καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας τῆς αὐτῆς Ἐμεσηνῶν πόλεως, ἀνδρὶ θαυμαστῷ καὶ ἐναρέτῳ, ὃς καὶ ἐκ τῆς 
προσούσης αὐτῷ θείας χάριτος ἐνόησεν τὴν ἐργασίαν τοῦ γέροντος, εἰς ὃν καὶ θαῦμα φοβερὸν ἐποίησεν οὗτος ὁ 
μακάριος Συμεών, οὕτινος θαύματος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τόπῳ μνημονεύσομεν. ὁ εἰρημένος οὖν θεοφιλὴς Ἰωάννης, ὁ 
ἐνάρετος διάκονος, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν τὸν ἄπαντα βίον σχεδὸν τοῦ πανσόφου διηγήσατο, τόν κύριον προβαλλόμενος 
τῶν λεγομένων μάρτυρα, ὡς ὅτι οὐδὲν κατὰ προσθήκην ἐπέγραψεν τῷ διηγήματι ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα ἐκ 
τοῦ χρόνου ἐπελάθετο. (Life of Symeon 59.16–24, trans. Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool, 135) 
50 In addition to the John the Deacon, other characters are presented as sources for Symeon’s sanctity as well in 
order to deal with the paradox of writing the life of a secret saint: whenever a character witnesses a miracle (s)he 
is forced to keep it silent (see below when ‘the audience of the holy fool/hagiographer’ is discussed), a motif that 
goes back to the gospel of Mark. However, the texts always specifies that the silence must be kept as long as the 
saint is alive, but that after his death, the character in question proclaims the story openly (e.g. Life of Symeon 
98.13 and 102.27–9). 
51 See for example Festugière, Léontios de Neapolis, 14. 
52 Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool, 23–4. 
53 On how Leontius manipulates the chronology of Symeon’s life to fit the proposed picture, see also Lennart 
Rydén, “Introduzione”, in P. Cesaretti (ed.), Leonzio di Neapoli. Niceforo prete di Santa Sofia. Vite dei Saloi 
Simeone e Andrea (BHG 1677, 115z). Premessa di Augusta Acconcia Longo. Introduzione di Lennart Ryden, 
Testi e studi bizantino-neoellenici, 19 (Roma: Dipartimento di scienze dell’antichità “Sapienza”, 2014), 33–54 at 
40–1.  
54 ὅτε ὅλον τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ ἐξεῖπεν αὐτῷ (The Life of Symeon 83.10, trans. Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool, 154). 
heard it from Symeon himself, the hagiographer not only establishes a direct connection with 
the saint, imbuing his own persona with authority, but also succeeds in layering on top of his 
own authorship two trustworthy narrative voices, which makes his own deliberate fashioning 
of the narrative move quietly to the background.  
Another option, which can be perceived in the Life of Andrew Salos, is that the 
hagiographer presents himself as the ‘well informed witness’, thus promoting himself to the 
forefront instead of lingering in the background of the narrative.55 In the Life of Andrew, now 
and then the hagiographer steps onto the stage as a character in the story, thus creating the 
illusion that he was a close friend of the saint and witnessed everything he tells us from close 
by. Since it has been argued convincingly that the Life of Andrew was written in the tenth 
century, while the saint, according to the text, supposedly lived in the fifth or the sixth century, 
the author’s claim that he himself was present at that time can certainly be revealed as a literary 
construction.56 In fact, Andrew himself must be an invented character.57 
The first time the hagiographer appears as a character is in lines 89–95, right after the 
detailed description of a dream of the saint in which he sees himself battling a demon.  
In the morning he came to me, unworthy though I am, telling me in 
confidence what he had seen. As I listened I was amazed, for a fragrance 
as from a very costly ointment issued invisibly from him. Having jointly 
considered the matter we decided that he should expose himself to public 
ridicule in the guise of one possessed by a demon and mad for the sake of 
him who said, “Be a fool for my sake and you will enjoy many good things 
in my kingdom.” For otherwise he could not escape from his earthly 
master.58  
In order to understand the appearance of the first person in this passage we must look at what 
precedes. The Life of Andrew starts out in a way not uncommon for a hagiographical text; after 
the prologue, in which the hagiographer speaks in the first person, presenting his story (‘I want 
to describe to you…’59) and imploring the audience to pay attention, the actual story begins in 
                                                 
55 As Rydén points out (Life of St Andrew, vol. 1, 28), the narrative situation of the Life of Andrew becomes even 
more complex when a second figure who functions as ‘témoin bien informé’ is introduced: Epiphanios, the 
young disciple of the saint. Thus, in the epilogue the hagiographer can claim authority twice over, saying that he 
wrote in his book ‘partly what I have seen with my own eyes, partly what I have learnt from the renowned 
Epiphanios who became bishop here’ (Life of Andrew 4396–7: ἃ μὲν καὶ οἰκείοις ὀφθαλμοῖς ἑώρακα, ἃ δὲ καὶ 
παρὰ τοῦ ἀοιδίμου Ἐπιφανίου τοῦ γεγονότος ἐνθάδε ἀρχιερέως μεμάθηκα).  
56 On the date of the Life of Andrew, see Rydén, “Date of the ‘Life of Andreas Salos’”, and on its ‘chronological 
fiction’, see Rydén, Life of St Andrew, vol. 1, 38. 
57 Rydén, Life of St Andrew, vol. 1, 143. There is a long tradition of pseudepigraphy in (Judaeo-) Christian 
writings. I thank James Corke-Webster for this observation.  
58  Πρωΐας δὲ γενομένης ἔρχεται πρός με τὸν ἀνάξιον καὶ θαρρεῖ μοι τὴν ὅρασιν. Ἐγὼ δὲ ἀκούσας ἐξέστην· 
εὐωδία γὰρ ἐξήρχετο ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀοράτως ὥσπερ μύρου πολυτίμου. Σκεψάμενοι δὲ ἀμφότεροι ἐκρίναμεν τοῦ 
παραδειγματίσαι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τάξιν δαιμονῶντος καὶ μαινομένου διὰ τὸν εἰπόντα· “Γίνου σαλὸς δι’ ἐμὲ καὶ 
πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπολαύσεις ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου.” Ἄλλως γὰρ ἀποδράσαι τοῦ σωματικοῦ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου οὐκ 
ἠδύνατο. 
59 βούλομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι (Life of Andrew 4). 
what appears to be a third-person narration by an omniscient narrator.60 However, in the passage 
quoted above, the hagiographer suddenly speaks in the first person again, this time representing 
himself as a character in the story next to the saint. After this passage, the third-person 
perspective appears to be resumed when the hagiographer picks up again his role as an 
omniscient narrator.61 Such sudden intrusions of the hagiographer in the story are found a 
couple of times hereafter and they do not occur randomly. The passage quoted above explains 
how the hagiographer was able to narrate the saint’s dream (a private experience that would 
normally not be accessible to him): it was the saint who told him in detail what he had seen. 
Other occasions when the hagiographer suddenly enters the stage of the narrative are also 
related to the narration of dreams and visions or to the narration of miraculous events (namely 
lines 408–21, where the hagiographer, while secretly observing Andrew, witnesses the saint 
levitating, lines 429–740, which include a long account by Andrew in which he narrates his 
experience of rising up to paradise during a severe winter storm, and lines 1786–90, where 
Epiphanios, Andrew’s disciple, goes to the hagiographer after having a divine dream and tells 
him about it).62 It seems, then, that the hagiographer appears as a first-person narrator in those 
moments when his narrative authority is questionable due to the fact that the event he is telling 
is either heuristically problematic or challenges the conventions of plausibility (by defying basic 
human capacities for instance).63 This relates to Turner’s observation regarding the use of 
explicit truth claims in hagiography: ‘precisely because their details are challenging, miracles 
are often an occasion to remind readers of the hagiographer’s factual integrity.’64 Here, the 
hagiographer’s efforts to write himself into the story on precisely those occasions presents a 
more covert strategy of satisfying the same literary needs.  
Whereas in the previous examples from the Life of Andrew the sudden switch to first 
person narration highlights the hagiographer’s position, the same narrative technique can also 
be used to do the opposite, that is, to conceal the hagiographer’s role from the reader’s view. 
This effect is created when the narration suddenly switches to a first person which is not to be 
                                                 
60 This typical mode of narration, found in many medieval hagiographical narratives, is described by Eva von 
Contzen, The Scottish Legendary: Towards a Poetics of Hagiographic Narration (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2016), 61. 
61 This is clear, for instance, in lines 101–2: ‘The cook woke up and, thinking day was dawning, went out to 
draw water.’ (Ἔξυπνος δὲ γενόμενος ὁ μάγειρος καὶ νομίσας ὅτι πρὸς ἡμέραν ἐστὶν ἐξῆλθε τοῦ ἀντλῆσαι ὕδωρ.) 
62 Apart from the four passages mentioned already, there is one other moment in which the hagiographer acts as 
a character in the story in the Life of Andrew, and where he firmly secures his role as ‘témoin bien informé’ by 
creating an intertextual parallel between himself and John the Deacon in the Life of Symeon. At line 224, 
reference is made to Symeon. Next, the hagiographer describes a situation which is reminiscent of a passage in 
the Life of Symeon (94.19–24) and clearly must be read in light of that reference: ‘In the evening he came to me, 
unworthy though I am, as I lay sleeping alone in my room. … He gave me a coherent account of everything with 
meekness, for only to me, O most faithful brothers, did he speak plainly and without dissimulation; to all others 
he feigned a deranged state of mind.’ (Life of Andrew 225–31: Ἑσπέρας δὲ γενομένης ἔρχεται πρός με τὸν 
ἀνάξιον, ἐμοῦ μόνου ἔνδον τοῦ οἰκήματος καθεύδοντος, καὶ ὑπομειδιάσας μικρὸν ἤρξατο δάκρυσι τὸ τίμιον 
αὐτοῦ πρόσωπον καταβρέχειν. Προσπλακέντες δὲ ἐπὶ πολλὴν ὥραν καὶ ἀσπασάμενοι ἀλλήλους ἐκαθέσθημεν. 
Ἐπηρώτησα οὖν αὐτὸν πῶς ἐν δεσμοῖς ὢν ἀπελύθη. Ὁ δὲ καθεξῆς διηγήσατό μοι πάντα μετὰ πραότητος· ἐμοὶ 
γὰρ μόνῳ, ἀδελφοί μου πιστότατοι, ὡμίλει ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀδόλως, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς φρενήρει διαθέσει.) As Rydén 
notes, ‘similarly, Symeon the Fool is said to have talked in an orderly manner only to his friend the deacon John’ 
(Life of St Andrew, vol. 2, 307). 
63 The narration of events which raise questions concerning the hagiographer’s knowledge of them due to their 
hidden nature is also discussed by Staat in her chapter in the present volume.  
64 Turner, Truthfulness, 27. 
identified with the hagiographer, but with one of the other characters. In the Life of Symeon this 
technique is used when the experiences of one of the citizens are related, and another time when 
those of John the Deacon are told.65 In both cases, the character in question, while normally 
being referred to in the third person, suddenly becomes a speaking ‘I’, a first-person narrator at 
the primary level of narration.66 The reader is left with the impression that (s)he is listening 
directly to the personal testimony of that character, without the hagiographer’s mediation 
intervening. The same happens in the Life of Andrew, first at lines 208–16, during the narration 
of one of Andrew’s dreams, and again at line 1734, where it is Epiphanios’ perspective that is 
taken when his divine vision is narrated. Here, the sudden switch from the third person to the 
first person does not aim at promoting the hagiographer to the forefront, as is the case elsewhere 
in this Life, but serves on the contrary to make him disappear in the background by promoting 
one of the other characters instead. The ultimate effect of both strategies is however essentially 
the same, and indeed, they are used within the same rather ‘problematic’ narrative context: the 
narration of a divine dream.  
The hagiographer can use different strategies to mask his deliberate shaping of the 
narrative; he can either construct for himself a prominent position at the forefront of the 
narrative action by taking up the position of well-informed witness (Life of Andrew), or he can 
hide behind other reliable narrative voices by presenting other characters as ‘témoin bien 
informé’ or letting them step in as primary narrators, directly addressing his readership (Life of 
Symeon and Life of Andrew). Thus the mask of the hagiographer can work in two directions, 
focusing the reader’s attention on what is a constructed façade, or directing attention away from 
what is actually hidden behind it.67 The Life of Andrew proves that both can be present in one 
and the same text. Like the mask of the fool, the hagiographer’s disguised self-presentation 
helps to direct the audience’s expectations. It eases the reader into taking seriously his explicit 
claims of truthfulness and historicity, often found in prologues and epilogues of hagiographical 
narratives, just like the holy fool’s nudity paves the way for the citizens to regard him as a salos. 
Thus, paradoxically, the hagiographer’s literary fashioning and fictionality lead to self-
authorisation. It is true that the need to portray reliability resonates with the idea that fictional 
narrative must to some extent deny its own fictionality in order to work as fiction (what Ryan 
calls ‘the paradox of fiction’).68 Otherwise, it would be hard for the reader to commit to the 
fictional game of ‘make-believe’. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the 
hagiographer presents his narrative as a true story, even when it is not. However, the mask the 
hagiographer puts on betrays a deeper need for authentication and supports the idea that the 
game rules of hagiography are different from those of what we call fiction today: while, 
according to the rules of the latter, the fictional truth that is communicated needs no validation 
outside of its attribution to the implied author’s design, the hagiographer apparently needs to 
                                                 
65 Life of Symeon 93.13–15 and 94.12–13 and 23–4. 
66 The hagiographer could have announced the direct speech of the character, using a phrase such as ‘he said,’ in 
which case in would have been clear that these words belong to a second, embedded level of narration. Since 
such an announcement is missing, the character appears to speak directly to us, at the primary level of narration.  
67 The two directions of the hagiographer’s mask described here can be related to the two modes of making the 
saint present that Claudia Rapp introduces and explores in a recent article: “Author, Audience, Text and Saint: 
Two Modes of Early Byzantine Hagiography”, SJBMGS 1 (2015), 111–29. 
68 Ryan, “Postmodernism and the Doctrine of Panfictionality”, 168. See also Morgan, “Make-Believe”, who 
discusses ‘strategies of realism’ in the ancient novel.  
perform a certain role and portray a certain character in order to earn the trust of his audience. 
This leads us to the next section of this chapter, which considers the (ambiguous) position of 
the reader and the question of belief. 
 
THE AUDIENCE OF THE HOLY FOOL/HAGIOGRAPHER 
One of them started a discussion, saying, “Brothers, curse upon Satan! 
How could this fool predict what happened to us?” One of the others 
answered, “You fool, do you not know that what the demon intends to do 
he tells his companion? No doubt it was the demon living with him that 
did this to us because we mocked him.” The first said, “Not at all! In my 
opinion God punished us because we beat him pitilessly.” The other 
replied again, “You fool, do you think God cares about a madman? God 
gave him a demon and we beat him for fun, there is nothing strange about 
that. Had he been a saint you would have convinced me that we were 
punished by God, but since he is mad God does not care.” Discussing this 
and other matters of concern to the young they went away.69  
If the city is the theatre in which the holy fool performs, then the people in the city are his 
audience. Often, the citizens that appear in the story do not have a name (though sometimes 
their profession is mentioned), an indication that they are the representatives of an abstract 
category of people. The people in the audience, the inhabitants of the city, generally do not 
realise they are watching a performance, or do they?  
In any case, the holy fool does everything he can to make his audience believe in his 
act. Apart from wearing the appropriate costume, which I discussed above, ‘it was the saint’s 
practice, whenever he did something miraculous, to leave that neighbourhood immediately, 
until the deed which he had done was forgotten. He hurried on immediately elsewhere to do 
something inappropriate, so that he might thereby hide his perfection’.70 His goal is to save 
                                                 
69  Εἷς δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν λόγον κινήσας ἔφη· “Καταργηθῇ ὁ σατανᾶς, ἀδελφοί, πῶς τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὁ σαλὸς ἐκεῖνος 
προεφθέγξατο;” Λέγει ὁ ἕτερος· “Ἔξηχε, οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ὃ βούλεται ὁ δαίμων ποιῆσαι, τῷ συμπράκτορι αὐτοῦ 
λέγει; Τάχα γὰρ ὑπὲρ οὗ ἐνεπαίξαμεν αὐτὸν ὁ συμπεριφερόμενος αὐτῷ δαίμων ἐποίησεν ἡμῖν ταῦτα.” Ἔφη ὁ 
ἕτερος· “Οὐχί, μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἰκάζω, ὑπὲρ οὗ ἐτύψαμεν αὐτὸν ἀνηλεῶς, διὰ τοῦτο ὁ θεὸς ἀνταπέδωκεν 
ἡμῖν.” Λέγει πάλιν ὁ ἕτερος· “Ναί, ἔξηχε, μέλει τῷ θεῷ περὶ σαλοῦ; Ἐκεῖνος γὰρ δαίμονα αὐτῷ δέδωκε καὶ 
ἡμεῖς παιγνίως αὐτὸν ἐτύψαμεν, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. Εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἅγιος, ἔπειθες ἄν με ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἀνταπέδωκεν 
ἡμῖν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔξηχός ἐστι. τοῦτο οὐ μέλει τῷ θεῷ.” Ταῦτα αὐτῶν λεγόντων καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ἅ εἰσι τοῖς νέοις 
ἐπιτήδεια ἐπορεύοντο. (Life of Andrew 260–71) 
70   Ἐπετήδευσεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁ ὅσιος, ὅτι καθότι ἐποίει τίποτε παράδοξον, εὐθέως ἤλλασσεν τὴν γειτονίαν 
ἐκείνην, ἕως οὖ λησμονηθῇ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὃ ἐποίησεν. ἔσπευδεν δὲ καὶ παραυτὰ σχηματίσασθαι ἄκαιρον τίποτε, 
ἵνα δι’ ἐκείνου 
ἐπικαλύψῃ τὸ κατόρθωμα. (Life of Symeon 81.5–8, trans. Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool, 152) A concrete 
example can be found in the Life of Symeon 81.22–5 (trans. Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool, 153): ‘Then the 
tavern keeper understood that Abba Symeon had broken the wine jar for the same reason. And he was edified 
and considered Symeon to be holy. Thereupon the saint wanted to destroy his edification, so that the tavern 
keeper would not expose him.’ (τότε οὖν ἔγνω ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι δι’ αὐτὸ ἔκλασεν καὶ ὁ ἀββᾶς Συμεὼν τὸ βισσίν. 
καὶ οἰκοδομήθη καὶ εἶχεν αὐτὸν ἅγιον. Θέλων οὖν ὁ ὅσιος ἀναλῦσαι τὴν οἰκοδομὴν αὐτοῦ, ἵνα μὴ θριαμβεύσῃ 
αὐτόν.) The reason why he does not want to be exposed is given in 78.23–5 (trans. Krueger, Symeon the Holy 
Fool, 150): ‘And his every prayer was that his works might be hidden until his departure from life, so that he 
might escape human glory, through which human arrogance and conceit arises, and which also made the angels 
souls without being exposed as holy.71 However, this enterprise involves a paradox,72 since the 
edified citizen necessarily becomes aware by means of his edification that he is dealing with a 
saint rather than a fool. As a result, while most people in the city are convinced that he is an 
actual fool and treat him likewise, sometimes a citizen discovers the true nature of the holy 
man, who then finds himself compelled to silence him/her by force so that his secret stays 
hidden. This happens, for example, in the Life of Symeon at 87.15–17, where the lips of the two 
monks who experience Symeon’s gift of prophecy are burnt so they cannot tell what they 
know.73 In the Life of Andrew, force is sometimes replaced by or combined with persuasion, as 
in the following passage:74 
 
When the pious woman came to herself after this vision she was greatly 
amazed and exclaimed, “How wonderful God is in his goodness! What 
luminaries he has on earth, and nobody knows it!” Often she wanted to 
tell some people what she had seen, but immediately a divine power 
prevented her, throwing her into a trembling so that henceforth she kept 
the miracle secret voluntarily. One day the righteous man met her and said, 
“Keep my secret for the time being, Barbara,” – that was her name – “and 
do not reveal it to anybody until I have come to the place of the wondrous 
tabernacle, to the House of God!” She answered, “Unfortunately I do not 
want to. And even if I want to tell somebody, I cannot, honourable 
luminary and wholly marvellous elect of the Lord, for I am prevented by 
an invisible power, and trembling enters my bones and my strength is 
troubled within me.”75  
 
The element of persuasion is important not just in this passage, but in the Life of Andrew in 
general. Whereas Symeon reaches his goals through acts, Andrew generally converts the people 
through words.76 Furthermore, in the Life of Andrew discussions often arise among the citizens 
                                                 
fall from heaven.’ (ἡ δὲ εὐχὴ αὐτοῦ ὑπῆρχεν πᾶσα τοῦ σκεπασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐργασίαν μέχρι τῆς αὐτοῦ 
μεταστάσεως ἐκ τοῦ βίου, ἵνα διαφύγῃ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαν, δι’ ἧς παραγίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπερηφανία 
καὶ οἴησις ἡ καὶ ἀγγέλους ἀπολέσασα ἐξ οὐρανῶν.) 
71 Life of Symeon 91.12–16. 
72 Further aspects of the paradox inherent in the fool’s conduct (as well as the paradox of writing the story of a 
holy fool, which I introduced above at p. 000) are discussed by Youval Rotman, Insanity and Sanctity in 
Byzantium. The Ambiguity of Religious Experience (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 
2016), 11–31. 
73 Other examples are found in the Life of Symeon 88.16–18 and 90.20–2. The topos goes back to Mark 1:44 (cf. 
Matthew 8:4) and a handful of other passages in Mark and Matthew. I thank Christa Gray for this observation. 
74 A similar passage is lines 1335–46, where the boy who witnessed the levitation of Andrew is silenced.  
75 Ταῦτα ὁρῶσα ἡ γυνὴ ἐκείνη ἡ θεοσεβὴς ἐξεπλήττετο σφόδρα ἐν ἑαυτῇ γενομένη καὶ ἔλεγε· “Βαβαὶ τῆς τοῦ 
θεοῦ ἀγαθότητος· οἵους φωστῆρας ἔχει ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐπίσταται.” Πολλάκις οὖν ἠβουλήθη τὰ ὁραθέντα 
αὐτῇ τισι διηγήσασθαι καὶ παραχρῆμα θεία τις δύναμις ἐκώλυεν αὐτὴν εἰς τρόμον ἄγουσα, καὶ λοιπὸν ἑκοῦσα τὸ 
θαῦμα ἀπέκρυπτεν. Ὅθεν ἐν μιᾷ συναντᾷ αὐτῇ ὁ δίκαιος καὶ λέγει αὐτῇ· “Φύλαττέ μου τὸ μυστήριον ἐν τῷ 
τέως, Βαρβάρα,” (τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὄνομα αὐτῇ) “καὶ μηδενὶ αὐτὸ ἐξείπῃς ἄρτι. ἕως οὗ ἐλεύσομαι ἐν τόπῳ σκηνῆς 
θαυμαστῆς ἕως τοῦ οἴκου τοῦ θεοῦ.” Ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπεκρίνατο· “Κακῶς καὶ οὐ θέλω· εἰ δὲ καὶ θελήσω τινὶ 
διηγήσασθαι, οὐ δύναμαι, τίμιε φωστὴρ καὶ ἐκλεκτὲ κυρίου πανθαύμαστε· κωλύομαι γὰρ ἀοράτῳ δυνάμει καὶ 
εἰσέρχεται τρόμος εἰς τὰ ὀστᾶ μου καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἡ ἰσχύς μου ταράττεται.” (Life of Andrew 3603–14) 
76 For example the monk at the Staurion (Life of Andrew 1952–2124).  
concerning the nature of the holy fool (like the one in the passage quoted at the beginning of 
this section):77 do his special powers arise from a pious or an evil source, and consequently, is 
he a saint or a possessed madman? As Rydén remarks, it is precisely in this no man’s land 
between the realm of the angels and the realm of the demons that the holy fool can operate.78 
Such discussions among citizens concerning the nature of the fool explicitly address the 
question of belief on the part of the audience in the performance of the saint and are 
symptomatic for their ambiguous position in the paradoxical game of the fool; on the one hand 
the citizens are led to believe in the act of the holy fool, who is said to deceive his audience (his 
performance is called apatè (‘deceit’).79 On the other hand, the result of this deception is 
edification, which means that the citizen realizes that (s)he is dealing with a saint who serves a 
higher cause and is then forced – or willing – to play along in his game of make-believe.  
Perhaps we can image the reader of hagiography to resemble the citizen when it comes 
to the ambiguous nature of his belief.80 Whether readers of hagiography actually took the 
narrative as factual/historical truth or not remains almost impossible to reconstruct. It is not 
unlikely, however, that both options were simultaneously in place, that some readers must have 
literally believed what was written, while others did not (or only to a certain extent). Like the 
people in the city of the holy fool, then, some readers may not have realised they were reading 
a fictionalised story, while others did but chose to play along with the game anyway. As such, 
the question of whether or not the audience took the narrative to be representing historical truth 
would be irrelevant to the functioning of the genre, and thus to the game rules of hagiography. 
Indeed, another type of belief, religious in kind, is at stake in this genre. And even if sometimes 
readers simply turned to hagiography for entertainment, like the people in the city ‘go have a 
drink where the Fool is’ because he brings them amusement,81 at the same time, stories about 
saints combine frivolous pleasure with very serious didactic purposes in a way similar to ancient 
myth.82 Although this combination does not fit into our modern system of thinking, which 
                                                 
77 Such discussions are abundant in the Life of Andrew, but they can also be found in the Life of Symeon, e.g. 
90.11–13 (trans. Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool, 160): ‘There was a certain village headman living near Emesa, 
and when he heard about Symeon’s way of life he said, “Believe me, if I saw him, I would know if he’s 
pretending or if he really is an idiot.”’ (Ἦν δέ τις πλησίον Ἐμέσης μένων πρωτοκωμήτης, καὶ ὡς ἤκουσεν τὸν 
βίον αὐτοῦ, λέγει· “πίστευσον, ἐὰν ἴδω, νοῶ ἐὰν προσποιητός ἐστιν καὶ ἐάν τε ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ἐστὶν ἔξηχος.”) 
78 Rydén, The Holy Fool, 110.  
79 See the Life of Symeon 56.21 and 82.12. 
80 This raises the complex question of who the audience of hagiography was, which requires a study in itself. 
Stephanos Efthymiadis and Nikos Kalogeras point out that the question of audience of Byzantine hagiography is 
an understudied topic; “Audience, Language and Patronage in Byzantine Hagiography”, in Efthymiadis, Ashgate 
Research Companion, vol. 2, 247–84 at 248. However, their own article also claims to trace the ‘intended 
audience’ rather than the actual one (ibid.). They point to Claudia Rapp, “Figures of Female Sanctity: Byzantine 
Edifying Manuscripts and Their Audience”, DOP 50 (1996), 313–44, for a discussion of the historical reader. 
81 See the Life of Symeon 81.8–11 (‘πίωμεν ὅπου ὁ Σαλός’) and the Life of Andrew 232–44, where the people in 
the city are said to deliberately seek out the holy fool because they find him entertaining. The analogy here is 
that both the holy fool and the hagiographer can win souls by first attracting them with entertainment. On the 
entertaining function of hagiography as the ‘mass media’ of its time, see Alexander Kazhdan, “Byzantine 
Hagiography and Sex in the Fifth to Twelfth Centuries”, DOP 44 (1990), 131–43 at 131. Edification through 
amusement is also emphasized by Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of 
Christian Discourse (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), esp. at 47–119, and von Contzen, The 
Scottish Legendary. 
82 According to Frye (The Secular Scripture, 22), classical mythology is ‘pleasant enough to entice the more 
light-minded reader, but when he digests [it] he will find that [it] is really wholesome food’. The fictionality of 
myth is discussed by Ryan, “Postmodernism and the Doctrine of Panfictionality”, 181. She writes: ‘It [myth] 
maintains a strong division between fiction and nonfiction and associates these categories with 
pleasure and didacticism respectively, in the ancient narrative system, where texts often seem 
to float between history and fiction, such associations are not necessarily valid.83 For example, 
ancient historiography used illustrative dialogue and rhetorical and dramatic modes in order to 
accomplish a ‘dramatic re-enactment of events’, while pleasure was also a ‘legitimate function’ 
of ancient historical texts.84 Conversely, ancient fiction (such as the Greek novels) adopted 
historiographical techniques of authentication.85 Thus, ancient literature was ‘a vehicle for 
shared truth rather than for the individual imagination’.86 Moreover, ancient biography, an 
important predecessor of Christian Lives, also blurred the line between history and fiction 
through its ‘willingness to read poetic truth as historical fact, and vice versa’.87 Finally, in the 
2012 book How to Do Things with Fictions, Joshua Landy explores the use of fictional stories 
in the Gospel of Mark, and contends that these captured the spirit of what Christianity meant 
for contemporaries, regardless of whether they actually happened this way.88  
Like ancient and late-antique historiography and biography, it seems, hagiography 
presents moral truths in a fictionalised form.89 The following passages from the Lives of 
                                                 
combined the guaranteed truth of fiction with the knowledge-claim of nonfiction and its referential anchoring in 
a non-textual reality. But in contrast to nonfiction, it conveyed this knowledge through a mode of expression that 
could be interpreted as figural.’ The parallel between hagiography and myth has been drawn by Alison G. Elliott 
(Roads to Paradise, 11), who states that ‘[fictional Lives] conform more closely to literary and mythic norms of 
conduct and portray the ideal rather than the actual’. See also Anthony Kaldellis, “The Emergence of Literary 
Fiction in Byzantium and the Paradox of Plausibility”, in P. Roilos (ed.), Medieval Greek Storytelling. 
Fictionality and Narrative in Byzantium (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2014), 115–30 at 120. 
83 Ancient literary and rhetorical theory classifies texts according to three instead of two categories: historia (or 
alēthēs; true narrative), fabula (or muthos; narrative that is untrue nor like the truth) and argumentum (or plasma; 
narrative that consists of invented material but nevertheless could have happened). Although Morgan, “Make-
Believe”, 190, calls this famous division a ‘flawed tool for thinking about fiction’ because it ‘lacks any element 
of intentionality’, the tripartite scheme nonetheless reveals a fundamental difference from modern thinking about 
texts. The third category, argumentum, seems to align with what is going on in hagiographical texts. See also 
Claudia Rapp, “Storytelling as Spiritual Communication in Early Greek Hagiography: The Use of Diegesis”, 
JECS 6.3 (1998), 431–48 at 443, on the criterion of plausibility in hagiography, a genre that does not ‘make a 
distinction between truth and verisimilitude or like-truth’. 
84 Morgan, “Make-Believe”, 184. For a discussion of Byzantine historiography and ‘how it explores the twilight 
zone between history and fiction’, see also Panagiotis Agapitos, “In Rhomaian, Persian and Frankish Lands: 
Fiction and Fictionality in Byzantium and Beyond”, in Panagiotis A. Agapitos and Lars Boje Mortensen (eds.), 
Medieval Narratives between History and Fiction: From the Centre to the Periphery of Europe, c. 1100–1400 
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2012), 235–68 at 258.  
85 Morgan, “Make-Believe”. On the hybrid nature of ancient narrative fiction, see also Niklas Holzberg, “The 
Genre: Novels Proper and the Fringe”, in G. Schmeling (ed.), The Novel in the Ancient World (Leiden, New 
York and Köln: Brill, 1996), 11–28 at 15–19. 
86 Christopher Gill and Timothy Peter Wiseman, “Preface”, in iid. (eds.), Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World 
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1993), vii–ix at viii. 
87 Patricia Cox, Biography in Late Antiquity, A Quest for the Holy Man (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press, 1983), xii. On the relationship between ancient biography and Christian Lives, see 
Patricia Cox, Biography in Late Antiquity; Marc Van Uytfanghe, “La biographie classique et l’hagiographie 
chrétienne antique tardive”, Hagiographica 12 (2005), 223–48; Samuel Rubenson, “Antony and Pythagoras: A 
Reappraisal of the Appropriation of Classical Biography in Athanasius’ Vita Antonii”, in David Brakke, Anders-
Christian Jacobsen and Jörg Ulrich (eds.), Beyond Reception. Mutual Influences between Antique Religion, 
Judaism, and Early Christianity (Bern: Peter Lang Publishing, 2006), 191–208; and Tomas Hägg, “The Life of 
St Antony between Biography and Hagiography”, in Stephanos Efthymiadis (ed.), The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Byzantine Hagiography, vol. 1: Periods and Places (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 17–34.  
88 Joshua Landy, How to Do Things with Fictions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
89 See Catherine Cubitt, “Introduction: Writing True Stories – A View from the West”, in Arietta 
Papaconstantinou (ed.), Writing ‘True Stories’. Historians and Hagiographers in the Late Antique and Medieval 
Symeon and Andrew seem to indicate that, like the holy fool, the hagiographer indeed serves a 
higher goal with his literary ‘performance’. In his prologue, for instance, Leontius says that the 
sinner must be aroused by a divine yearning ‘through the stories which are told to him’,90 and 
about Andrew we learn that ‘he loved to read the Holy Scriptures but even more the Passions 
of the martyrs and the Lives of the God-bearing Fathers, so that his heart was aflame with trust 
in them and aroused to imitation of their good way of living’.91 Furthermore, in lines 3788–90, 
once again the hagiographer appears and assures us that ‘this, my friends, I have learnt from 
blessed Andrew and written down for the edification of our souls, that we may consider how 
we lead our life in this world, for nothing escapes God and his saints’.92 Thus, paradoxical as it 
may sound, the hagiographer has no intention of deceiving his audience, but writes in order that 
their souls may be saved. Similarly, the holy fool, even though his performance is called apatè 
(‘deceit’),93 eventually (and paradoxically) targets religious truth. In both cases, in order to 
convey a specific kind of truth, moral in nature, the ‘fiction’ must be ‘believed’ in one way or 
another. Theorists have been struggling for decades with the question to what extent a reader 
of fiction can be said to ‘believe’ what he reads. Critics have often interpreted the reader’s 
position as one of a ‘willing suspension of disbelief’.94 In this regard, some have pointed at the 
problem of a reader’s emotional involvement with a fictional text: fiction, which we know to 
be fiction, can nonetheless move us to actual tears.95 In his chapter on the fictionality of the 
ancient Greek novel, John Morgan points out that ‘if it makes sense at all to talk about believing 
fiction, the belief must clearly be different in kind rather than degree from that accorded to 
straightforwardly factual statements’.96 When dealing with Christian literature, the question of 
belief becomes even more pressing when the issue of religious involvement is considered. If it 
is the kind of belief Morgan is referring to that is responsible for our tears when we read about 
the death of our favourite character in our favourite novel, then perhaps it is a similar kind of 
                                                 
Near East (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 1–12 at 11. In her introduction, Cubitt also refers to the ‘powerful, higher 
truth’ of the stories explored in the volume (“Introduction”, 12).  
90 δι’ ἀκοῆς καὶ διηγήσεως πρὸς αὐτὸν καταντώσης (Life of Symeon 56.7). 
91 Ἠγάπα δὲ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκειν τὰς θείας γραφάς, πλεῖον δὲ τὰ τῶν ἁγίων μαρτύρια καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεοφόρων 
πατέρων, ὥστε ἐκκαίεσθαι τὴν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν τούτων πεποίθησιν καὶ εἰς μίμησιν διεγείρεσθαι τῆς 
ἀγαθῆς αὐτῶν πολιτείας. (Life of Andrew 29–33) Other examples can be found in the Life of Andrew, e.g. lines 
731–37, where Andrew just told a story of his spiritual journey to Paradise and back: in this passage the narrator 
suddenly speaks in the first person, as discussed at p. 000, and testifies that ‘Blessed Andrew’s story sent my 
soul into a trance’. (Ταῦτα τοῦ μακαρίου Ἀνδρέου πρός με διηγουμένου εἰς ἔκστασιν φρενῶν ἤγαγε τὴν ψυχήν 
μου.) In another passage, the boy who witnessed the levitation of Andrew exclaims (1332–34): ‘My goodness, 
what a miracle! How many hidden servants God has, who lead a good way of life and have a good conscience! 
What we hear from the Lives of the saints we have seen with our own eyes.’ (“Βαβαὶ τοῦ μυστηρίου· πόσους 
κρυπτοὺς δούλους ἔχει ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἀγαθῆς πολιτείας καὶ συνειδήσεως, καὶ ἅπερ ἐν τοῖς βίοις τῶν ἁγίων 
ἠκούομεν, ταῦτα οἰκείοις ὀφθαλμοῖς ἑωράκαμεν.”)  
92 Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλοι, γέγραφα, μεμαθηκὼς παρὰ τοῦ μακαρίου Ἀνδρέου, πρὸς ὠφέλειαν τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν, 
ὅπως σκοπῶμεν πῶς περιπατῶμεν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ· οὐδὲν γὰρ λανθάνει θεῷ καὶ τοῖς ἁγίοις αὐτοῦ. 
93 Cf. note 79. 
94 This term was first introduced by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1907 (1817)). See also the chapter by Alwis in the present volume for a discussion of this term. 
95 Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, discusses reader involvement in chapter V. The question is also addressed by 
Walsh, The Rhetoric of Fictionality, in his chapter “Why We Wept for Little Nell”. See also Gregory Currie, 
“Emotion and the Response to Fiction”, in id., The Nature of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1990), 182–216, and Schaeffer, Pourquoi la fiction?.  
96 Morgan, “Make-Believe”, 193. 
belief that is responsible for the religious involvement of the readers of saints’ Lives, and which 
is targeted by the hagiographer.  
  
CONCLUSIONS 
According to Grosdidier de Matons, the task of the hagiographer is not to represent but to 
interpret; it is to present a model as perfect as possible.97 In order to do this, fictionality can be 
a powerful tool. Like the fool, whose theatrical performance is crucial to his mission of edifying 
the townsmen, the hagiographer presents a narrative that is not an accurate presentation of the 
historical truth so as to represent ‘not the life as lived, but the life as made sense of, the life 
imaginatively reconstructed and rendered significant’.98 In order to better understand the 
implications of such fictionalising practices for the literary contract between hagiographer and 
reader, I have further pursued the analogy between the hagiographer’s task of writing and the 
performance of the holy fool. Although the comparison will probably not elucidate every aspect 
of the game called hagiography, at least it has led to the following observations.  
Firstly, like the holy fool must wear a costume to support his performance, the 
hagiographer hides behind a mask to support his narrative and to authorize it. In fact, he can 
use different techniques to conceal his own authorship and/or generate an opportune self-
presentation, namely by appearing prominently in the text as a highly constructed or fictional 
persona, or, on the contrary, by disappearing from the text by promoting other narrative voices 
to the forefront. The double potential of the mask (i.e. to present a constructed façade and to 
hide what is behind it) in both cases results in a presentation of the material as reliable and 
trustworthy. From this it may be inferred that the rules of hagiography prescribe that all parties 
involved approach the hagiographical text as containing a message whose truth value is 
guaranteed by the authorial power of the figure of the hagiographer (in the case of his 
constructed appearance) or of his sources (in the case of his disappearance). In this respect, the 
rules of hagiography differ from those of what we regard as fiction today, since, according to 
the rules of modern fiction, both sender and receiver mutually agree on the fact that the message 
has no truth value in the world outside the text and therefore does not need any external 
authorisation (it ‘guarantees its own truth’).99  
On the other hand, although the hagiographer, like the fool, does everything in his power 
to make his audience believe in his literary performance, he does not intend to deceive his reader 
(which does align him with writers of modern fiction),100 since his ultimate goal is to rouse in 
his audience a different kind of belief, which is a belief in the religious rather than the historical 
truth of his narration. Here, it helps to compare the goal of the holy fool to edify the citizens 
through a theatrical show with the hagiographer’s practice of edifying his reader through a 
                                                 
97 Grosdidier de Matons, Les thèmes d’édification dans la vie d’André Salos, 277: ‘La tâche de l’hagiographe 
consiste, non à représenter, mais à interpréter un personnage hors série pour en faire un modèle aussi parfait que 
possible.’ 
98 Geoffrey Cubitt, “Introduction: Heroic Reputations and Exemplary Lives”, in Geoffrey Cubitt and Allen 
Warren (eds.), Heroic Reputations and Exemplary Lives (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 1–26 
at 3. 
99 According to Ryan’s definition (“Postmodernism and the Doctrine of Panfictionality”, 167). 
100 According to the definition provided by Morgan (“Make-Believe”, 225). 
fictionalised account, since both involve a paradox: like the spectator needs to believe in the 
feigned folly of the holy man in order to be edified and receive moral truth, the reader of 
hagiography needs to ‘believe’ the narrative of the hagiographer (regardless of whether (s)he 
actually takes it to be historically accurate) in order to benefit from its edifying qualities. In 
both cases, the ‘fictiveness’ of the performance is only instrumental to this higher goal. 
Eventually, what the hagiographer and the fool both aim at is to spread religious truth, and that 
despite (or is it thanks to?) their deceptions.  
While this ‘other’ kind of belief appears to correspond rather well to the kind of belief 
involved in a reader’s emotional engagement with modern fiction (different from the factual 
belief in the historicity of the events narrated), what is different here is that, given its religious 
nature, the truth that is proclaimed in the text has the real world as frame of reference, while 
the fictional truth of the modern novel is truth only within the fictional world, which is its frame 
of reference.101 This is illustrated by the fact that an author of a modern novel cannot (or should 
not) be held responsible for the ideological viewpoints his narrator or his characters proclaim 
(although there have been cases in the past where this occurred; think for instance of the trial 
against Gustave Flaubert or the attacks against Salman Rushdie).102 The fact that the 
hagiographer does seek to establish a direct link between the ideological statements issued in 
his text and the concrete reality inhabited by its readers accounts for the hybrid and paradoxical 
nature of the hagiographer’s enterprise, who wears a mask in order to imbue his narrative with 
reliability and authority and to disguise his literary fashioning, but without the primary intention 
of making his reader actually believe in the historical truth of his narrative (although this must 
have been the unavoidable effect in some cases). Rather than just adhering to strategies of 
realism to draw the reader into the text in order to achieve emotional involvement, the 
hagiographer must create for himself a more profound narrative as well as ideological authority 
for his audience to become religiously involved.  
The hagiographer is then indeed like the saint he is writing about (as Derek Krueger 
proposed) since his practice of humility results in the edification of others, and, more 
particularly, he is like the type of the salos, since this practice is inextricably connected to a 
kind of performance that is well compared to that of the holy fool, who also, in his nakedness 
and self-degrading, practices humility and fictionality at once. Moreover, shedding light on the 
fictionalising dimension of the hagiographer’s task has allowed to reflect on the intricate role 
of the hagiographer for the construction of the hagiographical text: he reflects onto his saintly 
subject a certain authority while at the same time the saintly subject reflects religious authority 
                                                 
101 Again according to Ryan’s definition (“Postmodernism and the Doctrine of Panfictionality”, 167). That does 
not mean that a modern work of fiction cannot say something about the real world in which we live (why would 
certain governments otherwise have censuring-policies?), but it always does so indirectly. 
102 Public prosecutors brought Flaubert to court for the immoralities proclaimed in his Madame Bovary in 1857, 
while more recently, Rushdie’s highly controversial Satanic Verses (1988) was the object of a violent storm of 
critiques. In both cases, the discrepancy between the rules according to which the prosecutors approach the 
literary work in question and the rules according to which the authors (and presumably also the modern-day 
public) conceive of it results in a painful misunderstanding with severe consequences.  
onto the hagiographer, all of which is achieved through his own narrative crafting, which 
establishes a complex but profound link between the hagiographer and the saint.103  
 
 
                                                 
103 See also Williams in this volume for an illustration of conspicuous modesty involved in hagiographical 
writing. 
